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IN THE SUPREME CO.URI~.ru~,;) 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LESTER A. JONES, dba ENGI~ I L E D 
& AIR SERVICE, .-. _ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, St? u -1957 
-vs.- -- ··;;;r-s·~;~;;~·-e:;;~·;t:···u"i~·h·--~ 
0. C. ALLEN, dba 0. C. ALLEN 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District, in and for the County of Salt Lake 
HoNORABLE JosEPH G. JEPPSON, Judge 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON, 
and WILLIAM S. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
LESTER A. JONES, dba ENGINE 
& AIR SERVICE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
0. C. ALLEN, dba 0. C. ALLEN 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 8709 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT 
This is an action for damages for an alleged breach 
of an implied warranty in connection with gear lubri-
cants delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff in its 
original containers. It was alleged by the plaintiff that 
the lubricant was used in certain vehicles, belonging to 
others which were in the plaintiff's shop for repair and 
that the vehicles were damaged by reason thereof. There 
was a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. The parties will 
be referred to as in the court below. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Lester A. Jones, is engaged in the 
business of overhauling trucks, stationary engines and 
air compressors. Prior to becoming self-employed, Mr. 
Jones was Superintendent for the Interstate Motor Lines. 
He had worked for them for a period of 17 years (R. 27), 
and while there he was in charge of the maintenance of 
motor trucks and equipment and used gear lubricant 
every day during the period of his employment. He used 
nothing but Kendall 200 oil in all of the equipment (R. 
28). He has been self-employed since 1952 and continued 
the use of Kendall 200 gear lubricant in his business 
(R. 31). 
The defendant, 0. C. Allen, is engaged in the whole-
sale oil business and has been for 40 years (R. 121). He 
has been buying and distributing Kendall oil off and on 
during that period (R. 122). During all times material 
to this lawsuit the defendant has purchased Kendall oil 
and lubricants from the Williams Oil Cmnp.any, a distri-
butor for l{endall Oil Company. The product comes 
directly from the Kendall factory to the \Villiams Oil 
Company and is stored in its warehouse until ordered by 
and delivered to the defendant. The defendant would 
then store the lubricant in his warehouse until he re-
<'eived an order from one of his custmners. The con-
tainers were never opened by the defendant (R. 122). 
In tlw Fall of 1955, l\Ir. Bate1nan, a cu.stomer of the 
plaintiff, took to the plaintiff's shop five trucks for re-
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pair (R. 32). Only two of the five trucks are alleged to 
have been damaged (R. 53-54) although the same lubri-
cant was used in all (R. 53). The two trucks s.aid to have 
been damaged we~re designated as Eaton 28M (R. 34,37). 
On the 6th day of November, 1955, the plaintiff ordered 
from the defendant by trade name 100 pounds of Kendall 
SAE 90-140 gear lubricant (Exhibit 9). The gear lubri-
cant w.as delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff in a 
100 pound red can marked Kendall SAE 140 gear lubri-
cant (R. 34, Exhibit 5). For the purposes of this lawsuit 
Kendall SAE 140 gear lubricant and Kendall 200 lubri-
cant are the same (R. 162). The container described the 
lubricant as ordered. When the container was received 
by the plaintiff it was sealed (R. 75). Approximately 
50 pounds of gear lubricant delivered on the 6th day of 
November, 1955, were used in the Eaton rear end assem-
bly of the first truck alleged to have been damaged (R. 
35). 
When the oil from the first barrel was put in the 
E.aton assembly the plaintiff noticed that it was thinner 
oil than he had been getting (R. 78-79). The balance of 
the gear lubricant from the first barrel was used in the 
single drive International which sustained no damage 
(R. 53-54). The next vehicle to be repaired by the plain-
tiff was the other unit allegedly dam.aged, which unit 
also cont,ained an Eaton rear end assembly (R. 34, 37). 
At the time this unit was repaired plaintiff was out of 
gear lubricant (R. 38). The plaintiff called the defendant 
.and told him he needed another barrel of Kendall oil to 
get the truck out and the defendant delivered the same 
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on the 14th day of December, 1955 (Ex. 10), a duplica~ 
tion of the first order (Ex. 9). The lubricant was de-
livered in a 100 pound container marked Kendall gear 
lubricant (R. 39, Ex. 5) sealed in the same manner as the 
first b.arrel and in the same condition as received from 
the Kendall factory (R. 122). 
The plaintiff in ordering the lubricant described the 
type he wanted by ordering Kendall 200 gear lube. He 
did not make known to the defendant how he intended to 
use the gear lubricant or what equipment he intended to 
use it in and the defendant made no representations in 
conneetion therewith (R. 38-39). 
As quickly as the ge.ar lubricant was delivered and 
opened the plaintiff noticed it was thin like the first 
barrel. Disregarding this fact, however, the plaintiff 
used approximately fifty pounds of the gear lubricant in 
the second truek containing an Eaton assembly (R. 40). 
During the month of January, 1956, ~Ir. Long, who 
was employed by ~Ir. Bateman, the owner of the trucks 
being repaired, took the R 190, the first truck .alleged 
to have been da1naged, back to the plaintiff's shop. ~Ir. 
Long ·and the plaintiff drove the truck, the s.ame vibrating 
considerably. The plaintiff told ~Ir. Long not to pay 
too n1uch attention to it (R. -Hi--±7). ~Ir. Long took the 
truck out of the shop, hauled one 1nore load and then 
returned the truck to the plaintiff. The plaintiff ex-
amined the trnek and found that the pinion shaft had 
h('('ll eut elcar to a knife's edge and that the pinion in 
.- .... 
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the running gear w.as cut off almost to the same point. 
The rear end of the truck was removed, washed and in-
spected (R. 48). The R 191, the second allegedly damaged 
truck, was returned to the plaintiff's shop by Mr. Bate-
man and the identical damage was discovered. The plain-
tiff does not know if .any lubricants were added to the 
rear ends of the R 190 or R 191 from the time they left 
his shop until they were returned by l\Ir. Long (R. 80). 
l\1r. Baternan testified that the trucks were checked con-
tinually while in operation and if they were found to be 
in need of transrnission oil the same was added (R. 94). 
Even though the plaintiff used the same gear lubricant 
in the other three pieces of equipment belonging to Mr. 
B.ateman he could not find anything wrong with them, 
however, he put in new lubricant and the same are still 
operating as far as he knows ( R. 53-54). 
Sometirne after the trucks were returned to the plain-
tiff's shop the plaintiff notified the defendant that there 
was something wrong with the oil. In response to the 
plaintiff's telephone call, the defendant went to the 
plaintiff's shop. They inspected the parts of the truck 
in question and the defendant took a sample of the oil 
from a pan in Mr. Jones' garage lying next to one of 
the trucks. The defendant does not know from which 
truck the oil was taken or how long it had remained in 
the pan. He sent the sample of the oil to the Kendall 
Oil Company (R. 134-135). 
A letter was later received from the Kendall Oil 
Company which in substance and effect stated that the 
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sample submitted to it was not representative of the Ken-
dall 200 gear lubricant (Ex. 11). The admitting of the 
exhibit into evidence was objected to by the defendant 
and will be referred to in greater detail in the argument. 
The plaintiff put some of the oil remaining in the 
barrel in a pint fruit jar and sent it to the University of 
Utah for a test (R. 52). The oil was given to a Mr. George 
Petty, who at that time was working as a student instruc-
tor in the Chemistry Department of the University of 
Utah. i\Ir. Petty did not run any chemical test on the oil 
to determine its contents. The only thing done by him 
was to take the oil, heat it and measure it for viscosity 
(R. 18). Mr. Petty did not know whether he was testing 
motor oil or lubricant, however, he admits that there 
is a distinction and that the test would be different for 
motor oil and for gear lubricants (R. 19). 
Both the oil companies and the manufacturers of the 
various trucks and equipment n1ake recommendations as 
to the type of oil or gear lubricant to be used in certain 
pieces of equipment. The Eaton ~Ianufacturing Com-
pany, which company manufactures the tanden1 drive 
axle found in the R 190 and the R 191, require a hypoid 
E.P. lubricant in order to haYe trouble free operation 
(Ex. 7), a gear lubricant different from Kendall 200 
as ordered by plaintiff (Ex. 11). 
Even though the plaintiff was fmniliar with the 
Eaton reemmnendations and knew that a hypoid lubri-
eant w.as reeonunended on tlw theory that it helps the oil 
.. ; 
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to stick to the gears (R. 70), he disregarded recommend-
ations and used one type of oil in all equipment repaired 
(R. 66-67). The plaintiff did this partly from experience 
and partly for his own convenience in servicing the 
trucks in his shop ( R. 68). 
The plaintiff readily admits that after the incident 
in question he followed the recommendations of the manu-
facturers and u.sed the recommended type of lubricant 
for the type of rear end in question and had no further 
problems (R. 84). 
The defendant's position, by his pleading and re-
quested instructions, was to the effect that the lubricant 
ordered by plaintiff was ordered by the trade name and 
number; that plaintiff did not advise the defendant for 
what type of trucks the lubricant was to be used or to 
what use the lubricant was to be put; that defendant, at 
the special instance and request of plaintiff, delivered 
in sealed drums or b.arrels the type of lubricant ordered 
by plaintiff (R. 5). 
The jury rendered a verdict of $1168.86 .against the 
defendant (R. 179). Subsequently the court overruled 
and denied defendant's motion for judgment in accord-
ance with motion for directed verdict and in the alterna-
tive the defendant's motion for a new trial (R. 183-184). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The court erred in its instructions to the jury. 
Under this point attention will be called to Instruction 
No.2 and Special Verdict Group 4 (R. 157,177, Exception 
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139), and In.struction No. 10 (R. 164, Exception 139). 
Under the Special Verdict Group 4 and the corresponding 
Instruction No. 2 the court improperly instructed the 
jury a;s to the burden of proof. Under Instruction No. 
10 the court held the defendant to the consequences of a 
warranty and confused the situation with a guaranty by 
the defendant to the plaintiff. 
2. The refusal of the court to give Defendant's 
requested Instructions 2 (R. 170), 3, 4, 5 (R. 151), 6 
(R. 152) and 7 (R. 153), for which exceptions were duly 
taken (R. 140-141), is error under this point. The re-
quests in the main placed the responsibility on the plain-
tiff, who got just what he ordered, and that the lubricant 
was sold in the manufacturer's container by trade name. 
Furthermore, that there was no implied warranty on the 
part of the defendant and the evidence is insufficient to 
show that he knew or had any reason to know of the al-
leged defect in quality of the lubricant so supplied. 
3. The court erred in denying defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict and in the alternative his motion 
for ,a new trial; the former on the ground that the evi-
dence was insufficient and both n1otions raising the ques-
tion of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a ver-
dict in fayor of p~aintiff. The 1notion for a new trial 
ra i ~P< l the question of the confusion in the instructions 
and thP admi~~ihility of Exhibit 11. 
--1-. The yerdict and the judg1nent entered thereon 
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THE TRIAL COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS ARE ERRON-
EOUS AND CONFUSING. 
It becomes obvious on reading the Special Verdict 
Group 4 .and corresponding Instruction No. 2 
that the court improperly instructed the jury 
as to the burden of proof. In Instruction No. 2 the court 
placed upon the defendant the burden of proving that 
an ordinarily prudent truck repairman would not have 
relied on the said oil as being 200 Kendall SAE 140. In 
the same instruction the court does not require the 
plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that .an ordinarily prudent truck repairman would have 
relied on the said oil as being 200 Kendall SAE 140. The 
plaintiff in his complaint alleges reliance, which is one 
of the essential elements to be proved by a person alleg-
ing a breach of warranty. In the case of Topeka Mill & 
Elevator Co. v. Triplett (Kan.), 213 P.2d 964, the plain-
tiff commenced an action to recover the balance due on 
an account for chicken feed. The defendants filed a cross 
petition for damages from the plaintiff by reason of the 
alleged false and fraudulent representation concerning 
the feed. The court held that the evidence failed to estab-
lish an express warranty on the part of the plaintiff as to 
the quality of the feed sold or what it would accomplish 
or that there was any reliance on an alleged warranty by 
the defendants. In this c.ase the Court st1ated: 
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"Absent the establishment of her reliance up-
on the alleged warranty no actionable warranty 
existed. · 
* * * 
\V e think appellants' evidence failed to es-
tablish an express warranty and that such a war-
ranty, if made, was relied upon by Mrs. Trip-
lett." 
It is also a fundamental rule of law that the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence e.ach and every material allegation contained in 
his complaint. The court in its Special Y erdict Group 4 
and the corresponding Instruction No. 2 ·wrongfully 
placed this burden upon the defendant. 
Instruction No. 10 is contrary to the evidence, does 
not properly state the law, is ambiguous, confusing and 
inconsistent with other instructions given by the trial 
court. In the first part of the instruction the Court in-
structs the jury that it was immaterial that the oil was 
delivered in a sealed container and in the same condition 
as received from the Kendall factory. In 77 C.J.S. Sales, 
Section 325, page 1179 it is stated: 
"*** "There a wholesaler sells goods to a 
dealer for resale, there is no in1plied warranty of 
fitne~~ for use, especially if the dealer sells the 
merchandise in unbroken packages received by 
him fr01n the wholesaler." 
Un<1Pr the same sPetion the author cites the case of 
1Jfaro11cy v. J!ontgomcry Tranl & Co., 34 S.E. 2d 302, 72 
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Ga. App. 485, Bell v. Adler) 11 S.E. 2d 495, 63 Ga. App. 
473, and states as follows: 
"A dealer does not impliedly warrant that 
an article in a perfect appearing original pack-
age manuf,actured by a reputable manufacturer, 
which in practical use in retail trade could not be 
examined for imperfections, is suitable for pur-
poses intended, and the only warranty by dealer 
in such circumstances is that article is manufac-
tured by a reputable manufacturer." 
In 77 C.J.S. Section 330, page 1191, it is stated: 
"It has been held that there is no implied 
warranty of quality or fitne.ss on the part of a 
retailer who sells fertilizer in the original pack-
ages.'' 
To hold otherwise would place an unreasonable bur-
den upon the defendant and would allow the plaintiff to 
escape liability, even though he is negligent. 
Instruction No. 10 also interprets a warranty as a 
guarantee, while in fact, the two are clearly distinguish-
able. A guarantee places liability upon the defendant 
regardless of whether or not he made repre.sent.ations in 
connection with said oil and ignores the question of in-
spection by and negligence of the plaintiff. Not only is 
the instruction ambiguous in the above particulars, but 
the Court by using the following language: 
"*** the theory of warranty which is a doc-
trine of the law requiring of sellers that they 
guarantee to the purchasers that the product 
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which they furnish is as ordered by the purchaser 
and in accordance with the representation made 
when the product purchased is delivered." (R. 
164). 
implied that certain representations were made by the 
defendant to the plaintiff, while in fact, no representa-
tions were made whatsoever and the implication would 
necessarily mislead and confuse the jury. 
POINT II. 
THE 'TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFEND-
ANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
The trial court erred in refusing Defendant's Re-
quested Instructions No. 5 and 8 pertaining to sales un-
der patent or trade name. The oil delivered by the de-
fendant was ordered under a trade name and delivered 
in a se.aled container. The plaintiff, in ordering the oil, 
described to the defendant the type of oil he wanted, but 
did not make known to the defendant how he intended to 
use it and the defendant n1ade no representations in con-
nection therewith. The plaintiff acted on his mn1 desires 
and took his own chances as to the fitness of the article. 
B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. LeJiars Gas Co. (1920), lSS Iowa 
584, 176 N.W. 338. 
If a thing is ordered for a special purpose and sup-
pljt~d and sold for that purpose there 1nay be an ilnplied 
warranty that it is fit for that purpose, but this rule is 
lin1ited to cases where a thing is ordered for a special 
purpose and n1ust not be applied in cases where a special, 
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definite described thing is ordered, although it is intend-
ed for an undisclosed special purpose. In fact, where 
there is a sale of a known, described, definite article 
there is no warranty of fitness for ,a particular purpose. 
In Section 60-1-15, Subsection (4), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, it is provided: 
"In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of 
a specified article under its patent or other trade 
name, there is no implied warranty a,s to its fit-
ness for .any particular purpose." 
The only warranty is that the goods are fit for the 
purpose for which the article is ordinarily or generally 
sold. The cases apparently hold that where the selection 
of the article is actually made by the buyer, the foregoing 
rule applies even though the seller knows that the buyer 
is purchasing the article for some special use. 46 Am. 
Jur., Sales, Section 351, pages 535-536; 90 A.L.R. 410; 
Landes & Co. v. Fallows, 81 Utah 432, 19 P.2d 389. In 
the case of Green Mountain Mushroom Co. v. Brown 
(Va.), 95 A.2d 679, page 683, it is stated: 
"The general rule is that if an article known 
under a patent name or tr.ade-name is ordered and 
furnished, there is no implied warranty for a par-
ticular purpose, since the buyer received what he 
bargained for." 
The above rule is controlling where goods are sold by 
a trade name. In the instant case .a particular purpose 
was not made known to the defendant, the article was 
not supplied for any particular purpose and the plaintiff 
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did not rely on the seller'~ skill and judgment, therefore, 
it falls squarely within the rule set forth .above. 
The refusal to give defendant's instructions as to 
inspection and sealed containers was error. In the instant 
case the oil was delivered from the Kendall Oil Company 
factory to the William.s Oil Company and later delivered 
to the defendant. The defendant then placed the oil 
in his warehouse in the same container as received from 
the Williams Oil Company where it remained until 
ordered by and delivered to the plaintiff in the same 
condition as received from the Kendall factory. The 
container was not subject to inspection until opened by 
the plaintiff and placed in a dispenser for the purpose 
of being used in the equipment in his shop for repair. 
The plaintiff, and not the defendant, had the first op-
portunity to inspect the oil and, in fact, did inspect the 
same. Upon said inspection the plaintiff noted that the 
oil w.as thin. The plaintiff made the same observation 
in connection with both barrels of oil delivered by the 
defendant. Where the buyer of goods has a better op-
portunity for inspection than the seller, and where such 
an inspection ought to have revealed an existing defect 
there can be no warranty of fitness. £\7 atio1wl Cotton Oil 
Co. v. Young (1905), 74 Ark. 14-1,85 S.\Y. 92. 
The plaintiff has been engaged in the business of 
servicing trucks for .a period in excess of 33 years. He i~ 
thoroug-hly familiar with oils and has been advised by 
various 1nanufacturers and distributors of oil and equip-
ment as to the proper type of oil to be used in the equip-
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ment which he repairs. The plaintif~ claims that the 
damage to the equipment involved in this lawsuit w.as 
caused by an oil which was too thin and for that reason 
failed to properly lubricate the gear mechanism. The 
defect which the plaintiff himself discovered on inspect-
ing the oil was the same defect which he claims defendant 
should respond for in damages. The plaintiff by using 
the gear lubricant after discovering the defect is estopped 
from asserting a breach of warranty in light of Section 
60-1-15, Subsection (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
which reads as follows: 
"If the buyer has examined the goods, there 
is no implied warranty as regards defects which 
such examination ought to have revealed." 
He is further precluded from recovering from the de-
fendant under the doctrine of negligence. If the defend-
ant were in any way negligent in supplying to the plain-
tiff oil of a defective quality, the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent in using the same after discovering the 
defect. In 46 Am. Jur., Sales, Section 807, page 931, it 
is stated: 
"Contributory N egligence.-In spite of his 
negligence, a seller is, of course, not liable there-
for to a buyer who, by his own negligent conduct, 
has contributed to the injury. And while the use 
of the purchased article in a particular manner 
which would otherwise appear to be negligent 
may be proper where the buyer relies, and has a 
right to rely, upon the seller's assurance that it 
is safe to use the article in such a manner, a buyer 
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who uses the article after he discovers the danger 
will be held to have as.sumed all the risk of dam-
age to himself, notwithstanding the seller's as-
surance of safety. * * *" 
This is true even though the seller may have given 
some assurance to the buyer of the safety in using said 
oil. Where it is clearly apparent from casual observa-
tion that the defendant delivered something different 
than that ordered, and with full knowledge of that fact 
he used the thing ordered to his detriment, the plaintiff 
is negligent and cannot recover. 
Even though the evidence in the instant case con-
clusively shows that the plaintiff ordered oil under a 
specific trade name in a sealed container, and made an 
inspection upon delivery, the court refused to grant the 
Defendant's Requested Instructions :2, 3, -±, 5, 6, and 7. 
By failing to give said instructions the trial court not 
only disregarded the evidence in the case, but also the 
law on sales. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A DIRE.CTED VERDICT AND IN THE AL-
TERNATIVE HIS MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
\Vhat ha~ prC'Yi<nl~ly been said under point :2 proper-
1)' supports tlw defendant's 1notion for a directed Yer-
did or in t h<' alternat iYC' for a n<:"w trial. The only thing 
left to lH' eov<>red under this point is the adn1issibility of -
Exhihit 11 into Pvidence. 
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Exhibit 11 is a letter from the Kendall Oil Company 
to the defendant acknowledging the receipt of oil alleged-
ly removed from one of the pieces of the equipment dam-
aged. The letter was offered in evidence by the plaintiff 
and objected to by the defendant as being incompetent. 
The trial court admitted the exhibit over the defendant's 
objection. The second paragraph of the letter reads as 
follows: 
"Our laboratory report, number 56156, found 
the gear lube sample to be an SAE 90 EP Gear 
Lubricant with a viscosity index of only 89.6. In 
other words, the sample submitted to us was not 
representative of Kendall #200 Gear Lube, which 
had been reported as having been used in the 
above mentioned rear .axle." 
The defendant takes the position that Exhibit 11 is 
hear.say and for that reason incompetent, and further 
is prejudicial. There is nothing in the letter to indicate 
how the examination of the oil was made. In the letter 
certain material facts are missing, which facts cannot be 
put before the court and jury as the writer is not in 
court subject to cross examination. Had the plaintiff 
called Mr. Hulme, the writer of the letter, as a witness, 
then the defendant would have had an opportunity to 
examine him in connection with the test made by his 
company. The fact that the oil had been placed in the 
truck and run for a certain period of time, and that there 
was a possibility of certain impurities and solvents being 
in the oil and how the test itself was run are material 
elements in determining the accuracy of the statement 
contained in paragraph 2 of the letter. 
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The subject matter of this letter is addres.sed to the 
most vital fact in controversy, namely: whether or not 
the gear lubricant sold by the defendant, and used by the 
plaintiff, was representative of Kendall 200 gear lubri-
cant. The letter offered in evidence to prove the facts 
asserted therein is an out of court statement, not subject 
to cro.ss examination and not under oath, and is hearsay. 
Baird v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 49 Utah 58, 162 P. 79; 
Bucher v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 
91 Utah 179, 63 P.2d 604. 
A hearsay statement offered as proof of the matters 
asserted therein cannot be accepted because it has not 
been made at a time and place where it can be subjected 
to certain essential tests or investigations calculated to 
demonstrate its real value by exposing latent sources of 
error. It is an untested assertion. The fundamental test 
of evidence is the right of cross examination. The reason 
for this is that many possible deficiencies, suppressions, 
sources of error and untrustworthiness, which may lie 
underneath the hare untested assertions of a "\\itness, may 
be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross 
examination. See Wigmore on Eridence, Vol. 5, 3rd Ed., 
Sections 1361-1362. 'vllere it appears that the evidence 
admitted is in fact incompetent and prejudicial its ad-
nlission is grounds for reversal. 
POINT IV. 
THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
I-... 
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From what has been previously stated the verdict 
of the jury and the judgment entered thereon are con-
trary to the evidence and the law as it pertains to war-
ranties. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact the gear lubricant was ordered by the 
plaintiff under a trade name, was delivered in a sealed 
container, was inspected by the plaintiff and appeared to 
be thin, wa.s placed in equipment requiring a different 
type lubricant and of which plaintiff was aware, .and 
the fact that the plaintiff did not make known to the 
defendant how he intended to use the lubricant, and 
the defendant made no representations in connection 
therewith, are all sufficient to support .a reversal. 
The errors of the court in refusing Defendant's Re-
quested Instructions, improperly instructing the jury as 
to the burden of proof, the definition of a warranty 
and the admission of Exhibit 11 into the evidence, added 
fuel to the fire. In the interest of substantial justice 
between the parties this judgment should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GUSTIN, RICHARDS & MATTSSON, 
and WILLIAMS. RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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